As this reader pens this missive, Vermont Yankee's twin- Fukushima - has caused a permanent evacuation of 160,000. The plant has created a radioactive no-go zone bigger than that left by the 1945 atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. What happened in Japan can happen in the United States.
Actually, Fukushima is not a twin. After the uprate in 2006, our plant is licensed to run at 120 percent of its original design capacity, making the whole operation a science fair experiment.
Fukushima's reactors did not fail because of a tsunami and earthquake. They failed because (old) General Electric boiling water reactors need grid power to function.
We can lose grid power anytime for any reason. Then, such reactors require generator power or they risk total failure.
If we had a New England grid-down event for any reason - solar storms, heat wave, sabotage, cyberattack, electromagnetic pulse, whatever - you would have a bunch of plants running on generator power. Indefinitely.
Our Fukushima will be the VY uprate. A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) at an uprated plant would have a huge risk of total failure due to the new pressurization.
Uprates prove that safety is not a number-one priority with the NRC, GE, or plant operators.
Quoting the NRC is laughable. Japan had its country's equivalent industry-lapdog agency. Credibility for the current NRC should not be taken as a given.
Ultimately, the argument of Jim deVincentis [ “VY: safe and reliable by 'all objective fact-based measures,'” Letters, Oct. 2] hinges on a view that does not see risk as real: “The plant's running fine - what's the problem?”
Risk is real. And in quantitative risk assessment, risk (R) is defined as follows:
R = Probability x Severity.
For Vermont Yankee, the severity of a fuel pool fire and boil-off would be infinity.
Solve for R.